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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

KELLY F. PEARSON,
Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.
Lower Court Civil No. 004907881
KIMBERLEE Y. PEARSON,
Respondent /Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 20040677-CA
Supreme Court No. 20060563-SC

PETE D. THANOS,
Intervenor/Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

APPELLANTS, Kimberlee Y. Thanos ("Kim") and Pete D. Thanos, ("Pete"), by and
through counsel, hereby submit the following as their Reply Brief pursuant to Rule 24 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF SCHOOLCRAFT.
A.

The Court of Appeals Erred in its Review of the Facts Bearing on
Standing.

The Utah Court of Appeals decision squarely conflicts with the controlling policy
considerations articulated by this Court in In re J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990)
("Schoolcraft"). The Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed, in part, due to the
1

fact that it erroneously substituted its own findings of fact for the findings of the trial
court prior to applying the Schoolcraft analysis. Contrary to Appellee's assertion,
Appellants reliance upon the case of Willey v.Willey, 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997), which
warned against the appellate court substituting its own findings for findings made by the
trial court, is not misplaced. (Brief of Respondent at 15-16.) This Court, in Schoolcraft,
concluded that whether an individual has standing to challenge the presumption of
legitimacy depends not on legal status alone, but on a case-by-case determination. 799
P.2d at 713. This Court found that the Court of Appeals analysis in Schoolcraft had been
"too mechanistic and, consequently insufficiently sensitive to the legitimate policy
consideration Schoolcraft raises." 799 P.2d at 713.
The determination of standing in cases like this one is not a mechanistic question
that makes it solely a question of law, as the factual findings directly bear on the question
of standing. Given the need to be factually sensitive in applying the particular facts to the
Schoolcraft analysis, the admonitions of Willey are wholly applicable. This court has
admonished the Court of Appeals that it should only make findings of fact in the most
extraordinary of circumstances. Willey, 951 P.2d at 235. Those extraordinary
circumstances do not exist in this case.
Unlike the cases cited by Appellee, Judge Medley received and considered
substantial independent factual information from the court-appointed custody evaluator,
Dr. Jill Sanders. (Brief of Appellants at 10-14.)
The Court of Appeals was in a inferior a position to examine the evidence, given
2

the heavy reliance upon the vacated October 17, 2001 Order. This court in Willey,
addressed both the question of whether an appellate court was in an equal position with
the trial court with respect of the facts at issue and the appropriateness of the Court of
Appeals rejecting the trial courts findings and accepting other evidence, despite a lack of
supporting evidence, in modifying the trial judge's award. In that case, this court
concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in making its own findings and substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court. 951 P.2d at 234.
In considering the facts of this particular case and applying the same to
Schoolcraft, Judge Medley had substantial factual evidence and extensive reports by Dr.
Jill Sanders. Despite this, the Court of Appeals rejected Judge Medley's findings and
adopted the vacated findings of Commissioner Evans. Those erroneous findings were
absolutely critical to the Court of Appeals' decision.
Based upon the Court of Appeals inappropriate substitution of its own findings, as
well as their reliance upon erroneous facts set forth by a commissioner in a vacated Order,
the Court of Appeals did err in its review of the facts bearing on the issue of standing to
challenge Zachary's paternity.
B.

The Court of Appeals Erroneously Interpreted the First Prong of the
Schoolcraft Test Regarding the Policy of Preserving an Intact Marriage
1.

Appellee's "Broad View" of the Policy Goal of Preserving the
Stability of the Marriage is Not Supported by Schoolcraft
Appellee asserts that the Court of Appeals has not made a finding that the
Pearsons' marriage was intact or that Thanos was "at fault" in undermining the Pearsons'
3

marital relationship. (Brief of Respondent at 17.)
Paragraph 21 of the Court of Appeals' Opinion states,
The trial court erred in failing to recognize that the Pearsons'
shared parentage of Z.P. represented a stabilizing force in their
then-existing marriage, and that the potential of a paternity
challenge would diminish that stabilizing effect. Thus, even after
the Pearsons filed for divorce, Thanos' challenge to Z.P.'s paternity
can be said to have had some undermining effect on the stability of
the Pearsons' marriage within the meaning of Schoolcraft's public
policy analysis.
The Court of Appeals' finding - one not found among those of the trial court - that
Pete destabilized the marriage, is made in support of its holding that Pete lacked standing
to intervene in this case. As has been previously argued, such a fault-based analysis is not
part of the Schoolcraft test. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals' finding is inconsistent
with the trial court's finding that "the ultimate cause of the termination of their [the
Pearsons'] marriage was their irreconcilable differences." (R. 2463.)
In effect the Court of Appeals has added a new element to the "intact marriage"
test: that who seeks to assert rights in a child must prove that he did not interfere with the
possible reconciliation between the putative father and the mother.
Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, Kim and Kelly's marriage was a
marriage in name only at the time the challenge to the child's paternity was made by Pete.
(R. 2533 at 465: 7-11; 452: 9-11; R. 982, f 18; R. 983, f 21.) Kelly Pearson had filed for
divorce and initially named Pete Thanos as an Intervenor in the pleadings. (R. 2 f 7.)
Further, the trial court made a specific finding that it was not Pete's fault that the parties
4

got divorced, but a product of irreconcilable differences. (Finding 57(d); R. 2463.)
Appellee's reliance on S.G. v. A.G. and J.G., 764 So.2d 807, 810 (Fla. Ct. App.
2000) misapprehends the purpose of the quoted text. The statement that "although
divorce may separate and strain a family with children, divorce does not end the
important child-rearing functions of the family," is merely a description of the
continuation of rights post-divorce and post-separation, concerning all children and
parents in divorce and marital relationships. The quoted language does not address the
question of standing, but the rights and liberty interests parents have in their children after
divorce.
Appellee quoted the following language from In re Marriage of Freeman, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996):
[T]he state has a well-recognized interest in preserving and
protecting the dignity of parental relationships, especially
where a marriage is being dissolved and instability is being
introduced into a child's life.
Id at 448.
While the State does have an interest in protecting parental relationships, that
interest must be balanced against the interest of the biological parent. The Schoolcraft
test requires an analysis of whether there is a stable or intact marriage in order to balance
that interest. In this case, at the date Pete filed for intervention, the divorce action had
been commenced by Kelly. (R.2 fl.)

Further, Kelly and Kim were divorced on June 7,

2002 (R. 855-856) which was prior to the date the court granted Pete leave to intervene
on November 7, 2002. (R. 971- 972.)
5

The Appellee cites to Freeman, but ignores the decision of the Supreme Court of
Texas, which, in defining the interest a state has in preserving the stability of a marriage
from outside attacks, stated in In Interest of J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994):
The State has a legitimate interest in minimizing familial disruptions that are
harmful to the child. But as the court of appeals observed, this marital unit was
clearly disrupted before Larry [biological father] ever filed this suit:
[T]hat the biological mother, for whatever reason, has chosen to engage in
sexual relations outside of marriage is proof itself that the "integrity and
solemnity of the family unit" has been damaged at least to some degree.
[Resolution of these difficulties by the husband and wife] does not, we feel
give license to the state to perpetuate the myth of "presumption of
paternity'1 so as to deprive the biological father of at least a chance of being
able to exercise those rightsy duties, privileges, and responsibilities that all
civilized societies have recognized to be fundamentally ingrained in the
concept of parenthood.
Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
For the J.W.T. court, the fact that mother engaged in illicit affairs outside of the
marriage was enough to undermine the policy of preservation of the stability of the
marriage, irrespective of the subsequent attempts to reconcile. No fault was attributed to
the biological father for any role in destabilizing the marriage of the putative father and
mother. Stability is merely a factor to be considered as it relates to the potential negative
impact it may have on a child to have his life disrupted by an outsider attacking a stable
and intact family environment that exists for the child. That policy does not extend to
preserving the solemnity of the marriage institution as it relates to the State's interests in
preserving the institution of marriage itself.
Appellee pontificates at length that a child's psychological tie to parents is
6

important and in need of protection, and that the stability of parent-child relationships that
are formed within the marriage are significant to the well-being of society. (See,
generally, Brief of Appellee at 18-22.) Appellants do not dispute this. In light of the
Schoolcraft test, however, all of those policies are balanced against the importance of
biological parents' rights. Appellee does nothing to demonstrate why Kelly should have
heightened protection for the child when the marriage was clearly broken prior to the
issue of Pete's intervention being considered by the trial court. The only question that
the trial court must consider is whether there is a stable, intact marriage that requires
heightened protection from the assault of a third party.
The Court of Appeals and Appellee would have this Court adopt a standard which
requires not only that the stability of a marriage be considered, but also the possibility of
reconciliation after separation or even divorce. This result would prevent any person in
Pete's position from ever having standing to assert his rights as a biological father.
Contrary to Appellee's novel theory, under Schoolcraft the Court should only have given
the marriage protection if the marriage was intact. This heightened protection was lost
when Kim and Kelly separated and Kelly filed for divorce.
2.

The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of Preserving a Marriage is
Inconsistent with the Policies Expressed in the Uniform Parentage Act.

Appellee cites the Model Uniform Parentage Act that was drafted by the National
Conference on Commissioners in 2000, and amended in 2002, in arguing that there is a
trend among states to limit or disallow a biological father from intervening to assert
7

paternity. The Model Act has a two year window in which a putative father can assert his
paternal rights. Though not enacted as part of Utah's Parentage Act, this window would
not be inconsistent with the trial court's decision in this case, because Pete's motion to
intervene was made within fifteen (15) months of Zachary's birth.
Appellee also cites In re CAW, 665 N.W. 2d 475, 478 (Mich 2003) for the
proposition that a biological father does not have standing to intervene in a child's
protective proceedings. The opinion in that case was based upon the fact that there had
been no finding that the child was not an issue of the marriage; implying that had such a
finding been made, the biological father would have been permitted to intervene.
Appellee further argues that Utah's Uniform Parentage Act, Utah Code Ann. §7845g-101 et seq. enacted in 2005, supports the Court of Appeals' opinion. The Act is
substantive, rather than procedural, because it substantially effects parental rights or
duties relating to children. This court has previously found that a statute effecting or
establishing a primary right and duty not in existence at the time that a claim arises may
not be applied retroactively. Brown and Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n, 947
P.2d 671 (Utah 1997) (citing Ball v. Peterson, 912 P2.dl006 (Utah Ct. App 1996)). Pete
filed his Motion to Intervene in the divorce proceedings in January, 2001, four years
before the Act was enacted. Judge Medley granted Pete's Motion to Intervene in 2002.
Therefore, this statute does not apply in this case.
Further, when introducing the bill in the 2005 Legislative Session, the sponsor,
Senator Hillyard, specifically stated that the policy reasoning behind the Act was to
8

follow a nationwide move toward every child knowing the identity of his or her parents.
(Floor Debate, 56th Leg. Gen. Sess. [Utah June 25, 2005]), Addendum 1. Senator
Hillyard and others emphasized that the Act provides a framework forjudges to follow,
not precise answers. (Floor Debate, 56th Leg. Gen. Sess. [Utah June 25, 2005]).
Senator Hillyard stated that although the bill was family-oriented and structured so
that a biological parent could not intervene in an intact marriage, that instances of divorce
should be viewed differently. Senator Hillyard's statements infer that the policy
considerations behind the bill were not specific to a biological father's intervention in a
divorce action. (Floor Debate, 56th Leg. Gen. Sess. [Utah June 25, 2005]).
Although Utah's Parentage Act does not provide a statute of limitations, it does
create a procedure to rebut a presumed fathers paternity. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g201(2), provides in relevant part, that "the father-child relationship is established by a
man and child by (a) an unrebutted presumption of the man's paternity under § 78-45g204... [or]... (c) an adjudication of the man's paternity." Pursuant to §78-45g-204
Appellee is the presumed father of Zachary. While the Act creates a presumption that
Appellee is Zachary's father, that presumption is rebuttable. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g204.2, specifically states that a presumption of paternity established under that section
may be rebutted in accordance with § 78-45g-607. Moreover, the Act provides that a
proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained by a man whose paternity of the
child is to be adjudicated. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-602(3).
Appellee argues in his brief that the Act, § 78-45g-607, sets forth a policy that
9

establishes a "strict limitations period and the doctrine of estopple to the paternity of
children having a presumed father." (Brief of Respondent at 22.) In point of fact, § 7845g-607 only limits the time in which a mother or presumed father may bring a parentage
action. It does not provide a limitation on the other entities who can declare paternity.
The Act states that "paternity of a child conceived or born during the marriage with a
presumed father may be raised by the presumed father or the mother at any time prior to
filing an action of divorce or in the pleadings at the time of the divorce of the parents."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607 (2006). With the exception of a mother and presumed
father § 78-45g-607 does not prevent those listed in § 78-45g-602 including an "alleged
father" from initiating a paternity action.
The Legislative history makes clear that the purpose of § 78-45g~607 was to
require divorcing parents to raise any paternity issues prior to or as part of a divorce
proceeding, so that a mother or presumed father would be precluded from later using
paternity issues to impact child support or parenting time. (Floor Debate, 56th Leg. Gen.
Sess. [Utah June 25, 2005]). Consequently,§ 78-45g-607 requires that the issue of
paternity to be raised within the pleadings at the time of the divorce of the parents.
Zachary's parentage and recognition that Pete is Zachary's biological father is
contained throughout the entire record of proceedings. Appellee stated within his
pleadings in the divorce action that Pete is the biological father of Zachary. {See,
Complaint R. 2 f 7.) Kimberlee denied, Kelly's biological relationship with Zachary and
affirmed that Pete was Zachary's biological father. (R. 20 f 7.) Furthermore, in Pete's
10

Motion for Intervention and subsequent paternity action, which was consolidated with the
divorce action, Pete established that he was the biological father of Zachary through
genetic testing. (R. 37-41; 992-999.)
Kim raised the issue of paternity in the divorce case. Pete had no similar
requirement. Nonetheless, Pete filed a paternity action which was consolidated into the
divorce action. Thus, even if the Utah Uniform Parentage Act had been enacted at the
time of commencement of this case, Pete's challenge to Kelly's paternity was timely.
C.

The Court of Appeals Erred in its Application of the Policy of
Protecting Children from Disruptive and Unnecessary Attacks upon
Their Paternity.

This court, in Schoolcraft, stated that in determining whether an individual has
standing to challenge the presumption of legitimacy depends on a factually sensitive and
case-by-case analysis. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals did not consider the facts
found by Judge Medley in making its determination that the challenge to Zachary's
paternity was disruptive and unnecessary. The Court of Appeals relied primarily upon
vacated findings contained in the Commissioner's recommendation of October, 2001.
Basing its opinion on this vacated recommendation, the Court of Appeals found that Pete
had little interest or involvement in Zachary's life until he was approximately 16 months
of age. This is contrary to the record, which evidences that Pete wanted to be involved in
Zachary's life and that he had multiple interactions with Zachary after his birth. The
evidence also shows that upon Kim's separation from Kelly, Pete was able to significantly
increase his interaction with Zachary. (R. 637-640, R. 2553.)
11

The Court of Appeals made further findings that Zachary had a father and was not
in need of a different one (Pearson v. Pearson, 2006 UT App 128 f 30) and that an attack
on Zachary's paternity at this point "would be disruptive to Zachary's strong paternal
relationship with his father." (Id. at f 33.) Neither of these findings is supported by any
portion of the record and appear to be a moral judgment rather than one based on a
factually sensitive assessment of the child and parties in this case.
In his reply, Appellee glosses over the arguments presented by Appellants.
Appellee, merely reiterates the Court of Appeals opinion. Based upon this Court's
opinion in T.H v. R.C. (In re E.H.), 2006 UT 36 137 P.3d 809 trial courts must take into
account and be sensitive to the particular facts of a given case. In the instant case, Judge
Medley employed various tools and mechanisms for acquiring factual information in
order to ensure that he and complied with the directive of Schoolcraft.
The Court of Appeals, wholly ignored much of the findings and evidence of the
trial court in their Opinion and merely stated that Zachary already had a father with whom
he was bonded. Pearson, 2006 Ut App 128 f 30, 134 P.3d at 179. The court refused to
recognize that Zachary was also bonded with Pete and that he later lived with Pete and
Kim in an intact family unit. (Findings 7, 8, 9 and 10, R. 2337-38, 2473.) By relying
primarily upon the vacated findings of the Commissioner and rejecting the substantial
evidence that was before Judge Medley, the Court of Appeals improperly applied the
necessity test.
Further, Appellee has not responded to Appellants argument that by ignoring a
12

substantial portion of the record and the findings of Judge Medley, the Court of Appeals
has substantially limited and/ or created a new "necessity" test that only looks at the child
at one time, in the first few months after birth to determine whether a claim for paternity
and establish paternal rights in unnecessary or not. This is an inflexible and inconsistent
view of Schoolcraft and is not supported by statute or any other case law. In fact, this
strict interpretation is contrary to the policy considerations of the Uniform Parentage Act,
as discussed, supra, in section LB.2. When the Act was adopted in Utah, the articulated
purpose was to ensure that a child's best interests would be considered in determining
whether or not a biological father could intervene or adjudicate his paternity.
The Court of Appeals' strict interpretation of the policy considerations in
Schoolcraft also deny any consideration of what is in the best interest of Zachary.
Zachary's best interests were specifically examined by Dr. Jill Sanders when Judge
Medley asked Dr. Sanders whether or not Pete's intervention was unnecessary to Zachary.
Dr. Sanders stated that Pete's involvement in Zachary's life was not only not disruptive,
but necessary to his psychological well being. (Finding 12: R.980.) Such emphasis by Dr.
Sanders and by Judge Medley as to the best interests of Zachary, is consistent with the
policy considerations of Schoolcraft a swell as general policy considerations of this state.
The Appellee argues that the Court of Appeals' approach in the instant case was
consistent with the policy consideration of Wells v. Children Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199
(Utah 1984) and In re J.M and N.P. 940 P.2d 527, 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). However,
both of these cases dealt with children who were born outside of a marriage, and involved
13

the issue of adoption and the need for permanent home. Neither are applicable.
As evidenced by the record, Judge Medley used calculated and comprehensive
steps to ensure Zachary's best interests were served. Based upon the evidence before
him, Judge Medley found that granting Pete's intervention was not only unot disruptive,
but necessary" to Zachary's psychological well being. The Court of Appeals wholly
disregarded the trial courts thorough examination of Schoolcraft's policy considerations.
D.

The Court of Appeals Erred in Preventing Pete from Intervening in the
Divorce Case to Protect his Liberty Right as a Parent.

On December 22, 2000 Appellee commenced this case by filing a Complaint for
Divorce and Custody Order. (R. 1-5.) On approximately January 15, 2001 Pete filed his
Motion for Intervention (R. 37-41) in which he sought to intervene in order to obtain a
judicial determination of his parentage of Zachary and for the purpose of protecting his
"liberty interest provided for by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution and by the Utah State Constitution." (Verified Motion for
Intervention, % 3, R. 37-41.) By ruling that Pete could not intervene in the case, the Court
of Appeals effectively prevented him from protecting his parental rights in Zachary.
Appellee argues that the Opinion should be affirmed because Pete had no
constitutionally protected interest in Zachary at the time of the filing of his Motion to
Intervene. The argument should be rejected because as a matter of constitutional law and
state statute Pete's undisputed paternity gives him certain rights in Zachary.
1.

As Zachary's Biological Father Pete had the Right to Seek Custodial
and Parent-Time Rights.
14

At all relevant times, including the date upon which Pete filed his Verified Motion
and the date of the trial, the Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45a-l et
seq. was in effect.1 Section 78-45a-2(l) provided that "[pjaternity may be determined
upon: (a) the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the public authority
chargeable by law with the support of the child...." Section 78-45a-10.5 stated:
(1) If the court determines that the alleged father is the father,
it may upon its own motion or upon motion of the father,
order visitation rights in accordance with Sections 30-3-32
through 30-3-37 [concerning parent-time awards in divorce
cases] as it considers appropriate under the circumstances.
(2) Visitation rights may not be granted to a father if the child
has been subsequently adopted.
Thus, under Utah law Pete as the "alleged" father, had the right to seek the award of
parent-time, even if he were precluded from attacking Appellee's paternity.
In addition, this court in Schoolcraft recognized that because of their special
relationship to a child, individuals other than natural or legal parents may seek custody of
that child. 799 P.2d at 714-715. By definition Pete, is a "close relative" to Zachary, as he
is Zachary's biological father and the husband of Zachary's mother.
The relationship between a parent and a child is constitutionally protected as a
fundamental constitutional right and is often referred to as a "parental liberty right". See
In re J.P.. 648 P.2d 1364, 1375 (Utah 1982); State ex rel. Rov Allen S. v. Stone. 196
W.V. 624, 474 S.E. 2d 554, 561, 562 (W. V. 1996); and Michael H. v. Gerald D, 491 US
1

The Act was repealed in 2005 and replaced by the Utah Uniform Parentage Act.
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110, 136 (1989) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Pete sought leave to intervene both to protect his rights under the Uniform Act on
Paternity and his constitutional rights. For the most part, the Opinion deals only with
Pete's attempt to establish paternity under the Act. In its Opinion the Court relied heavily
on the two-part test for standing in Schoolcraft which focuses on the question of who may
challenge the presumption of paternity. In doing so it overlooked the second reason for
Pete's Verified Petition: to establish the boundaries of his liberty right in Zachary.
Though acknowledging that Pete is Zachary's biological father, the Court of
Appeals adopted what amounts to a laches concluding that by failing to "perfect his
inchoate parental rights" during the first sixteen months of Zachary's life, Pete lost those
rights. Pearson, 2006 UT App 128, f 36, 134 P.3d at 180. The Court's analysis
concerning the loss of Pete's liberty interest in Zachary and its reference to an "inchoate
parental right" are based upon it's analogizing this case to a situation in which a
biological father fails to assert his rights in the child in a timely fashion. Pearson, 2006
UT App 128, f 34, 134 P.3d at 180.
Appellee, too, relies heavily on this analogy in his defense of the Opinion. (Brief
of Respondent at 35-39.) The problem with this analysis is that the need for a speedy
acknowledgment of paternity by a father whose illegitimate child has no legal father is
not present in the situation where a child is born to a mother who is married. In the case
of an adoption this Court has described the state's interest in obtaining a speedy
determination of paternity as follows:
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The state has a strong interest in speedily identifying those
persons who will assume the parental role over such children,
not just to assure immediate and continued physical care but
also to facilitate early and uninterrupted bonding of a child to
it parents.... To serve its purpose for the welfare of the child,
a determination that a child can be adopted must be final as
well as immediate.
Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah 1984).
In light of that policy, Utah law requires that a father of an illegitimate child who
wishes to preserve his liberty right in the child must do so before the child is adopted.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(l)(e). By contrast, no Utah statute requires that a father in
Pete's position take any particular steps in order to preserve his liberty right.
In this case there is no public policy similar to that found in the divorce setting
which would require Pete, even if he had been able to do so, to have more than occasional
contacts with Zachary until Kim and Kelly had separated. In point of fact, however, once
the Pearsons were separated, Pete established what the trial court found to be "frequent
and consistent" contact with Zachary. (Findings f 9; R. 2438.)
The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that biology, standing alone, is not
enough to create a liberty interest between a biological father and his child born out of
wedlock. Where, however, a relationship between the father and the child has been
established, the liberty right is entitled to constitutional protection.
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to
participate in the rearing of his child," [citation omitted] his
interest in personal contact with his child requires substantial
protection under the due process clause.
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Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261, 102 S.Ct. 2985, 2993 (1983); J.W. v. State ex rel S.
R , 2005 UT App 324, f 17, 119 P.3d 309, 313 (Utah 2005) (father's failure to register in
New York's putative father registry coupled his with failure to cultivate his relationship
with his child demonstrated a failure to commit to the responsibilities of parenthood).
In this case the trial court found that Pete had not only established his paternity,
but had proven the existence of a strong personal relationship between him and Zachary.
Pete therefore had established a liberty right entitling him to exercise parent-time and
custody. Such an award was made by the trial court based upon a finding that the granting
of parent time and custody to Pete and Kim jointly was in the best interest of Zachary.2
2.

The Court of Appeals Refusal to Allow Pete To Intervene Prevented
Him From Protecting His Liberty Right in Zachary.

Utah R.Civ.P 24(a) defines the circumstances under which a person may intervene
as a matter of right in a pending lawsuit. See, Addendum 2.
The Court of Appeals held that Pete should not have been granted leave to
intervene; however, rather than applying the criteria for determining the appropriateness
of intervention found in Rule 24, it relied solely upon the two-prong test of Schoolcraft
concerning standing. But Schoolcraft is not a case about intervention; it is a case about
standing to question the paternity of the husband of the mother of a child born during
their marriage.
2

Contrary to the impression left by Appellee's brief, he was awarded substantial parenttime with Zachary. See Supplemental Decree of Divorce, Paragraphs 6 and 7. (R. 2505 2508.)
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It is beyond question that Pete has a potential liberty right to maintain his
relationship with Zachary and that he was entitled to intervene in the case to present
evidence, not only of his paternity, but of his past relationship with Zachary. Appellee
initially states that Pete has no protected liberty interest in Zachary (Brief of Respondent
32-34), but later contradicts himself by discussing the clear parameters of the liberty
interest that Pete does not have in Zachary and criticizes how Pete went about perfecting
those liberty interests (Brief of Respondent 35-38.) The Court of Appeals' Opinion
would prevent Pete from protecting his constitutional right and should be overruled.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS REFERENCES TO THE TRIAL COURT'S
OCTOBER, 2001 ORDER WERE CRITICAL TO ITS OPINION.
In his Brief, Appellee asserts that the Court of Appeals' references to the October,

2001 Order were immaterial to the decision. That statement is incorrect in two aspects.
First, it was not the "trial court's" Order that was relied upon, but the recommendation of
a domestic relations commissioner, which was contained in that October, 2001, Order.
Second, the Court of Appeals did indeed rely heavily upon the "facts" that the
Commissioner articulated in that vacated October, 2001 Order. The Court of Appeals'
reliance on that Order and the findings contained therein, fundamentally altered the
court's reasoning and substantially undermined Judge Medley's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and the resulting Order of November 7, 2002, granting intervention,
as well as the court's May 8, 2003 Findings and Order on Intervenor's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.
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The Court of Appeals specifically referred to the 2001 Order, and stated, "In light
of those findings, we cannot say that Thanos' attack on Zachary's paternity would not
have been disruptive to Zachary's paternal relationship with the father and expectations
about whom his father was." Pearson, 2006 UT App 128, f 28, 134 P.3d at 179.
Appellee argues that the Court of Appeals' reference to "findings" refers to Dr. Sanders'
findings in her May 13, 2002 and August 26, 2002 reports. (Brief of Appellee at 40.)
Even a cursory review of the Opinion reveals that its reference to "those findings" in
paragraph 28, refers to the findings contained in paragraphs 25, 26 and 27. Those
paragraphs specifically refer to and rely upon the vacated findings of the October, 2001
Order. (See, Addendum 3, f j 25-28).

Appellee has attempted to minimize the

importance of the Court of Appeals reliance and references to the October, 2001 Order.
Furthermore, Appellee failed to issue the question of the Court of Appeals'
unconstitutional reliance upon and elevation of the recommendation of the Commissioner
over the detailed findings of the Judge Medley.
Appellee's argument, as set forth in Section II of his Brief, also contains the
erroneous and conclusory statement that "the trial Court did not 'vacate' those facts, and
did not vacate its findings." This statement is patently incorrect and contradicted by the
clear language of the trial court's order of intervention, which stated in paragraph 1: "The
Objection to Recommendation of Peter D. Thanos is sustained. The Order of
Intervention, dated October 17, 2001, is hereby vacated." (Emphasis added.) (R. 972.)
It is illogical and insupportable for the Appellee to argue that the Court of Appeals
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could have included language from the October, 2001 Recommendation of Commissioner
Michael S. Evans, in two full pages of its analysis (See, Paragraphs 25 through 28,
Addendum 3), and yet conclude that it would have no effect on the Court of Appeals
decision to overturn the trial court's granting of standing to Pete Thanos.
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE PETITION
FOR REHEARING BECAUSE ITS OPINION DOES NOT PROVIDE
CLEAR GUIDANCE TO THE TRIAL COURT CONCERNING CUSTODY.
The Court of Appeals should have granted the petition for rehearing to clearly state

that the trial court may consider Pete's kinship relationship to his biological son. Appellee
argues that Zachary's relationship to Pete, who is both his biological father and a current
"functional" father, may be considered so long as that relationship is what Appellee calls
"function-related" but not "biological." (Brief of Respondent at 48.) This
biological/function-based dichotomy is not workable and is nowhere found in the
Opinion. Similarly, Appellee's argument that the trial court should order a new trial and a
new custody evaluation (Brief of Respondent at 43) is contrary to the Opinion which
remanded the case for entry "of a new custody order." Pearson, 2006 UT App 128, f 39,
134 P.3d at 181. Appellee's proposals are a tacit admission that the Opinion is flawed.
A.

If The Court of Appeals' Opinion Directs The Trial Court Not To
Consider The Kinship Of Pete And Madeline To Zachary, It Should Be
Reversed.

If the Opinion is read as prohibiting the trial court from considering Zachary's
biological relationship to Pete in awarding parent-time or custody, the decision should be
reversed by this Court. Appellee argues that "biology plays no role in the custody
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determination, and is not a factor to be considered in assessing [Appellee's] and Mother's
respective custody claims in their two children". (Brief of Respondent at 45.) This claim
is inconsistent with this court's decision in Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah
1982) and with C.J.A. Rule 4-903 (5)(E)(vii)which require the consideration of "kinship"
in the awarding of custody.
Appellee fails to explain why C.J.A. Rule 4-903 should be disregarded, but
attempts to distinguish Hutchison by noting that when Hutchison listed "kinship" as a
factor to be considered, 649 P.2d at 41, it cited as authority In re Cooper, 17 Utah 2d 296,
410 P.2d 475 (1966). Thus, argues Appellee, the kinship requirement applies only in
cases involving the fact pattern in Cooper: namely, a situation in which a relative of a
birth parent petitions for adoption after a child is taken permanently from the custody of
the natural parents. There are two problems with this argument. First, this Court in
Hutchison did not limit the kinship requirement to the very narrow fact pattern found in
Cooper. Second, the decision in Cooper specifically states that "in custody matters, all
things else being equal, near relatives should generally be given preference over nonrelatives.. ." 410 P.2d at 476. Thus the Court recognized that kinship is a factor
"generally" to be considered.
While it is true that both Hutchison and C.J.A. Rule 4-903 recognize that stepparent status may be considered as a factor in a custody determination, the inclusion of
that additional factor does not in any way diminish the primary meaning of "kinship"
which is a "[Relationship by blood, marriage or adoption." Black's Law Dictionary 887,
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(8th ed. 2004). Rather, the language of both Hutchison and the C.J.A. Rule 4-903 is simply
an indication that an additional factor "in extraordinary circumstances" may be stepparenthood. Pete unequivocally fulfills two of the three categories of "kinship." He is
related to Zachary by both blood and marriage.
B.

The Trial Court, Rather Than An Appellate Court, Should Decide
Whether the Kinship As Well As The Family's Complicated History, is
Relevant to the Award of Custody,

It is the trial court, not an appellate court, which is charged with determining what
is in "the best interest of the child". Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5)(a). Trial courts are
given wide latitude in determining a child's best interest and their findings are only to be
set aside by courts of appeal if it is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse of
discretion. Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) This principle is
consistent with the Schoolcraft rule, which only addresses a putative father's standing to
attack a de jure father's paternity. The Schoolcraft analysis can be applied to the issue of
whether Pete has standing to attack Kelly's paternity, but not his right to seek custody or
parent-time of his biological son. In Schoolcraft this court stated, "[T]he fact that a
person is not a child's natural or legal parent does not mean that he or she must stand as a
total stranger to the child where custody is concerned." 799 P.2d at 714.
Appellee argues that the Court of Appeals intended to exclude all evidence of the
biological relationship of Zachary to his biological parents and sister. Thus in Appellee's
view it is irrelevant that Zachary's mother is living with his biological father and sister
and that the evaluator and the trial judge found that the three children should not be
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separated (Finding 34.b., R. 2449), and unimportant that the evaluator testified that "the
relationship between parents and their biological children is psychologically extremely
important." (Finding 17, R. 2441.) Appellee contends that as the trial court considers
how to apportion custody, it may not consider that Zachary is living in his own
biologically intact family. Instead, says the Appellee, the trial court should be instructed
that it may only consider "function-related factors": i.e. the children's functioning in the
home of Appellee and the Appellants. (Brief of Respondent at 48.)
This proposed "function-related" rule—at least in the form proposed by
Appellee—is unworkable. It is not realistic to suppose that a trial judge or a custody
evaluator can separate the biological component of a child's relationship with his father,
mother or sibling from the sociological component.3 Pete is not Zachary's step-father;
nor is he a complete stranger who arrived sometime during Zachary's childhood. Pete is a
biological parent, who has been a part of Zachary's life. Zachary looks like Pete. The
trial court should not be instructed to overlook this kinship relationship or Pete's
relationship with Zachary up to the time of trial in determining what type of custody
arrangement is in Zachary's best interest. The exclusion of evidence of kinship and of the
Thanoses' efforts to establish an intact family unit proposed by Appellee should be
rejected. The correct rule, is to reaffirm that the trial judge is in the best position to
3

"The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he
grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future,
he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable
contributions to the child's development." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. at 262.
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decide to what degree kinship should be taken into account in deciding what is in the best
interest of Zachary.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals has rendered an opinion that has substantially modified the
Schoolcraft test. The Court's mechanistic and insensitive Opinion has created an
artificial statute of limitations that is inharmonious and inconsistent with Utah policy
outlined by this court in Schoolcraft.
Further, the Court of Appeals based its Opinion on substituted facts by erroneously
relying on the recommendation of the Commissioner, which was later vacated by the
careful findings of the trial court. If upheld, the Court of Appeals decision, will deny Pete
his constitutional rights and leave biological fathers and their children without means to
establish, nurture and maintain a parent-child relationship.
Pete and Kim Thanos respectfully request that this court reverse the opinion of the
Utah Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley.
DATED this
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Senate Bill 14, Uniform Heritage Act, Senator Hillard
Senator Hillard, I am sure there is no question about this bill.
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Thank you Mr. President. I told Senator Chris Butters that I grew up in cache valley that
after boy scouts there for any period of time, you heard the old Ephraim story so many
times, that you could repeat it, and so this bill has been here before and I have explained it
before and there were a lot of questions raised and interest in this bill and let me just
explain to you that sometimes when we focus on the surrogate part of it we miss the two
most important parts of the bill and really why it was done. The first part of the bill, deals
with an effort that really started nationally and in every state and I am glad to say that it is
not as big an issue in Utah as in many states and that's with the prowess that every child
who is born ought to know who the parents are and so often times we have unwed
mothers giving birth to children and we have never really taken the step, well we can now
with DNA tests, to determine the parentage and have not only the issue of financial
responsibility but health issues as well so that we know some of the things inherited by
that. But what this great (in audible) of DNA we can make that identification, we have
opened up areas of the law that really have not been adequately addressed by the
legislature and I really think there is a need for us to do that in this regard, because if we
don't, then the courts will be forced to make the decision. That is really the challenge in
Utah law right now is that different judges make different rulings. The first part of this
bill really deals with parentage, and what it creates a little bit ago somebody asked what
the difference was with the uniform that I was on the committee that drafted, here in Utah
we have given even greater emphasis as to what I will call the social father. Senator Hale
gave me a letter that was pretty touching of a woman who married into a family the
husbands wife had just died with three little children and she was the mother as a I recall
for 8 years for that time period. There was a divorce and there was an immediate marriage
3 days after and married another woman and blocked her form having her have any
contact with any of these children because she was not the biological mother. When you
see some of those things happen in children's lives, you often see often times see a step
mother or step father can be even a better father than the biological parent. So this court
this bill doesn't answer the question precisely in every case, but it gives guidelines to the
courts to create consistency across our state so that these biological situations, while very
important, may be overridden in certain cases taking into concern the best interests of the
children. I can imagine the trauma for those children and the mother after 8 eight years of
being in all sense the mother of these children, being barred because she is not
biologically the mother. So this bill would give some relief in that area and give the court
some guidelines and protection. I can tell you that this bill is very family oriented and
family privy. We followed the president of a California case where if you have an
attacked marriage, for example, that the biological parent could not interfere with that
intact marriage. A California case involved a husband and wife they separated, and the
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wife lived with another man, and became pregnant at that point in time the husband
accepted her back. So she moved back and the resumed their marriage relationship and
then the baby was born and the biological wanted visitation. And the court in this bill says
the same thing, that parents together create the family. Now if they were getting divorced
there would be a different situation involved. There is also different guidelines (in
audible) tells me that a constant problem that they have is that people get divorced, 5-10
years later the father now is not having visitation with his children, I mean a bad situation,
he then has a DNA test, which can now be taken fairly simply, discovers that he is not the
biological father, so he want r4s to not only terminate the child support, which would go
retroactive back to the time of the divorce and pay the money back, and again we address
this issue mainly on the person having reasonable notice, now I say that because I could
answer some questions on this. One of the difficult things in doing family law cases
before the legislature is the fact that all of us have had a niece who got a divorce 4 years
ago and it turned out bad and we want to make sure that the law protects here. It is sad to
say most of us have been touche with divorce in our immediate families which I guess for
my parents and grandparents did not turn out the same. But with the divorce, visitation,
DNA testing these factors I think are important. I presented this bill at the midwinter
meeting of the Utah State Bar and there were a number of district court judges who came
up and said please, please get this bill passed, because it does give some guidelines to
help up us in some very difficult areas. The second part of the bill is really part of the
adoption counsel. We have been very careful in this bill to protect biological fathers who
want to maintain a relationship with the children that they helped to have born. And we
have also put some pretty strict guidelines that if they done adhere to these procedures,
their parental rights can be terminated. One of the issues that the adoption counsel told me
is that our current law has different mechanisms in which you file notice of paternity of
claim. The trouble for the adoption agency is that when they to perceive the claim, they
have to check the registry to make sure no father has filed a claim and it is not technically
that registry then they can proceed with that adoption without his consent and so some
fathers have actually filed some claims that have not been properly registered and they
have been failed to be protected. I cannot think of a more horrible circumstance for any
lawyer of family than to place the child for adoption, to have the adoption done and for
someone to come back four of five years later somebody comes back with a legal
technicality problem and that makes the adoption not valid and now you are faced with
losing your child. So I really appreciate the help of the adoption counsel and again this
law is slightly different in that regard because of unique Utah Circumstances. The third
thing that has the most publicity, and I'll tell you, when we started talking about this on
the committee, about a surrogacy law, I said that there is no way that I will ever carry a
bill that is initially proposed in Utah. I knew the Utah over ten years passed a law,
outlawing surrogate parenting, so that you understand that law doesn't make it a crime,
that law simply makes it that the agreements cannot be enforced. So that you and your
wife are contracted with a third person, a surrogate, a woman to carry your child and she
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got the to the end of the birth period and said " no I am going to keep the child" under
Utah law you could not enforce the agreement, because we just made it illegal to do that.
Also, since I have filed this bill and some of the publicity, I am sure that it is going on in
Utah right now. Many of the people who want the protection of the law have to leave
Utah and go outside of Utah to have it done in their protection. What really brought this,
and you will know this when you see the draft as we did as a commission, we bracketed
this part, which meant you could adopt the uniform law and not do anything gestational
agreements and still have uniform laws. It was really an optional part of it. I will tell you
the thing that really changed my mind, were two things, I was really impressed to be there
with that committee we had a number of the supreme court of Montana, we had a court of
appeals justice from Minnesota, who severed in the legislature, we have several law
professors, we had lawyer from Texas, we had a former state senator who was a lawyer
out of Kansas, we had the head the head of the Office of Recovery Services from
Massachusetts, all working on drafting this bill, and when we started talking about the
matter it became our goal in drafting this bill, to make it family, marriage privy. As you
read in the papers this morning, the main people who criticize this bill say that I don't go
far enough. We agreed as a committee, it was not just something that was drafted up in
my office in Logan, it took a number of meetings from people from all over, and when
people say that it's unconstitutional, I guess anything can be unconstitutional, but we feel
that this law is very clear, because what we have allowed is god forbidden, you now have
an area, if you do something that does not follow this law, you don't have the protection
of the law, we say meeting these categories: No. 1, you have to be a married couple, No.
2. The intended mother has to have a serious health problem, so that to do the surrogacy
she has to have some medical evidence that she just doesn't want to be bothered with the
pregnancy, No. 3. The surrogate mother has to have gone through a pregnancy before, so
she understands physically what she is going through and that it is all pre approved by the
court. If the court that the surrogate mother needs more counseling if there are parts of it
that the compensation agreed to is too high or too low, we have the protection of the
courts to do that. Then that becomes the argument, should we let everybody? I don't think
so. Quite frankly, if the amended bill provides that anyone should do this to non married
couples, I would take that part out of that bill. I will not sponsor a bill that has that
provision. There may be areas that can be expanded, but I want to take this first step into
it, so that we have further protection. What really the second thing, besides the fact that I
feel, is the final draft in this bill was something that I could defend and that I could
represent and I could feel good about was the fact that we had a federal district court
decision here a year or so ago, where the federal district court held that our law banning it
made it unconstitutional, excuse me making it unlawful, in that particular case if you read
the facts of the court, you have a couple in California, who hired a surrogate mother and
took his sperm and her egg and then planted it in the surrogate mother. They were they
intended parents but also the biological parents. Then the woman came to Utah gave birth
to the baby and they went to get a birth certificate. Our state law is that the birth mother is
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the biological mother, and so the presumption was that they had to have a birth certificate
with the birth mother on. The law suit was filed saying "no that is unconstitutional
because they are the biological parents and they should be on the birth certificate". The
irony is when you read judge Jenkins decision, although he says that our proposition
making it unlawful violates their constitutional rights, those circumstances, he never
solved the problem of the birth certificate. And actually our department of health issued a
new birth certificate and that is really one of the protections of this bill. So let me just
touch what this bill does. It would be easier to say what it doesn't do, but what it does do,
is it provides for a married couple, who meet these criteria, to go to the court and get an
agreement and once that agreement is approved then when the baby is born, the birth
mother says "no, I don't want to give the child up", tough, she made an agreement, about
the adoption then the baby is delivered back. It provides a birth certificate that the
intended parents, it may be a situation where they have purchased a egg and it is the
man's sperm, or some other criteria to do this, the birth of the intended parents by this
court, would then show up on the birth certificate as the parents. So it would deal with
that issue as well. You may have the intended parents who say the child was born
handicapped and they don't want the child, tough, they for all intense the parents of this
handicapped child, and they cant back out either. One of the things that I like about this
bill, is I also have a provision here that says , that if you do this without court approval,
and a baby is born in this world, and you are not talking about adoption, you are creating
a child, you are not talking about a child that is already here, it is about you creating a
child, if that child is born and you do not have a legal binding agreement, then the court
can step in and order appropriate child support. The court ought to make that
determination on a case by case basis. The way that we have it now, I would assume, that
the birth mother give birth to the baby, and the intended parents say that I do not want the
child, or I want a boy and it's a girl, I wanted a blonde not brunette so I do not want the
child. The way it is, there is no way to force it one way or another. I would assume that
child will probably end up in an adoption agency to be placed for adoption. Or the mother
may feel that she will keep the child, or whatever may go on. So, I say that with this
regard because there are groups who say I.... I want to address a letter that I received the
morning of our hearing in the committee from the ACLU, I almost cheered when I got it,
because I know that it is not really an issue that is going to destroy my bill. But you know
it always kind of concerns me when I get a letter the morning of a hearing when a bill has
been around for 2 years. They could have told me before hand, but let me just address
this. They have four concerns about my bill. First of all, they say that it too narrowly
draws the provision for termination of gestational agreement. Their concern is that they
think the gestational mother should be able to terminate this agreement at any time up to
what they say at least 24 hours after the birth of her child. They have not heard my bill.
Because the bill says once approved by the judge, it is a binding agreement, and the
gestational mother cannot come in three months later into the pregnancy and say "gosh, I
have decided that I do not want to give this child up." I mean that is what the court
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procedure that I will go through, so she loses that right when she goes before the court
and she sings the agreement and agrees to be the gestational mother, she has agreed to do
that. Now, I guess the judge would have to say if the woman did not know, to say "well
do not sign the agreement." I cannot give her what they want, number 2 and number one
because it would destroy the whole intent of the bill, and the whole purpose of having it.
Number 2, it says the intended mother, ok they were concerned because I require the
intended mother to have a health problem before getting into this contract. I thought that
it was really interesting, I would like to read this,.... the us supreme court has made a
fundamental right to chose whether to bear or begat a child they then moved and moved
this one step further and say that woman have a fundamental right to chose when the
contract with the gestational mother
whether they can have an abortion. I don't really
understand how that gets to be a fundamental right, and I would like to see the court case
fight for that. So, that is their concern that we are violating the intended mother's right if
she decides not to have children for whatever reason she wants to (in audible) this
agreement, that we have violated her rights. Again I would say that what we are doing
here is authorizing under certain circumstances for it to be done. The third thing is the
requirement for this couple to be married. They think that is unconstitutional. I'll let
senator Chris Butters bring up that issue. And the fourth one is we provided here that the
gestational mother here for her health to be able to have an abortion if that is her choice,
to do that. I have had some people say that you should limit that and I say listen, you have
got a gestational mother who has been through a pregnancy before, she has come before
the court and gone through all of that, I cannot for the life of me imagine, if she asks to
have an abortion, it is a very serious health problem to her. I don't want to try and get into
and define all of that, I think that is optional thing. Since I have filed this bill and had
committee hearings, I have not asked, but I have had a number of surrogate mothers come
up to you and it just touches your heart. Some of the people who very much want to have
children, cant. But through this process of surrogacy, they can even take their own egg or
sperm from the husband and can create a child that they not only know theirs emotionally
but biologically and so I say this maybe I am doing well because we have groups on both
sides that say I go too far and I don't go far enough, I really feel comfortable with the
work that we did on a committee of certainly as diverse as you will ever find that worked
on this parenting bill on a national level to come up with this proposal. I think in light if
we don't pass the surrogacy part of this bill then I will submit to where we were when
Judge Jenkins decision of absolute no mans land in what we are doing in this area. I think
anyone can feel comfortable with how far we have come. Does anyone have any
questions? Thank you Senator.
Thank you Mr. President, I do have a question of the sponsor.
Thank you.
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Correct me if I am wrong, Senator, did I hear you say that towards the end of your
presentation that this bill authorizing abortion on demand.
No. What I said... I will read you that part of the bill. The bill provides the gestational
mother for her health to make her own health decisions as to what's going on. So if the
issue got to be that the doctor said, this woman is going to die with this pregnancy, she
makes the decision as to whether to keep the pregnancy.
Well isn't that the case now. Please make it clear.
See, I need to understand Mr. President if you don't' mind if I could follow up. I just
want to make sure that I understand that the bill requires the same level of medical
involvement for lack of a better term that we currently have that is only in the case where
the mother's health of the baby's health is in jeopardy. I want to make sure that we are
not softening that position by this bill and if you can assure me that is the case, then that
would be fine,
I feel comfortable saying yes it does.
The concern we have is when we did this agreement starting out, the whole emphasis is to
give everyone protection in you know what you have . So the concern of what may
happen (in audible).
One more, you indicated in your comment that the mother will make the decision as to
whether she wants to carry the child based on her opinion as to the impact that it might
have on her health and I want to know specifically if the bill addresses specifically
addresses the involvement of her doctor in that decision.
Though the gestational agreement may not limit the right of the gestational mother to
make the decision to safeguard her health and that of the unborn fetus. So it leaves it open
as a gestational agreement as to what exactly what those terms would be, that you could
not (in audible) choose to do something for her own health that would jeopardize the fetus.
I have not spelled out that, and I will tell you the reason that you don't want to do that is
the Supreme Court could change those decisions you don't want (in audible) the statute. It
will be the gestational agreement. That the gestational agreement cannot grant any right
under that agreement that is currently prohibited by the law. Senator butters?
I don't know where it is, but I think that we ought to find it. Senator Hilliard you know
we never have a bill under 1000 lines this is one is right on edge at 1475. Having said that
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my committee the last couple of years, (in audible) all over senator Hilliard about the
gestational agreement. I believe that you have done a wonderful job.
Senator walker?
Thank you Mr. President. I guess speaking is only what 5 of us in here can . I look at this
as a mother and a grandmother I think how hard it would be to do this. My question is,
does the mother have legal counsel when she goes to court separate from the parents. I
would suspect that the trial judge when he approves this has a lot of different
expressionary things that he could do. I think that if the judge felt any uncomfortable
position with the mother that he could advise her to get an attorney, a psychologist,
counseling whatever that is really the intent to do that. So we have not required it but we
have required the court approval and so I think that will cover your issue.
I wonder, there are a million different scenarios who goes through pregnancy and who
gives that child up for adoption and then she needs money and she decides that she wants
to be a surrogate mother. I wonder if we shouldn't have more specificity in there about a
mother. You know I have been reading the articles that they have had in the tribune on
surrogacy. That woman, I mean, it does sound like a wonderful and beautiful thing for her
and what a blessing that it is tot hat Japanese family who is going to receive that baby. I
do worry about, and I guess because I have never been a surrogate mother, I have only
been a mother of my own child and I can't imagine giving up a baby and I worry about a
mother who thinks that she can do this and who has not fully considered the ramifications
whether you talk about a mother that gives up a child for adoption or a woman has an
abortion and I just worry about that birth mother because when you have a child within
you, and you feel that life, it would be difficult to give that up.
I would agree. I have seen adoptions where moms have given up children and I know
how difficult that would be from viewing that. Senator Walker I will give you the
commitment that I gave Senator Butters, he raised the issue about the money. I really
want to monitor this with the courts and see what happens because I may have judges
come back to me and say, you know you ought to make this change or that change,
because you know again, I have met some marvelous surrogate mothers who do this and I
mean they take it as almost a mission in life that they can give life to a couple who so
desperately need it and cannot do it themselves. I want to compliment Kristen Stewart for
the article she wrote in the Tribune I didn't have anything to do with it, but I am trying to.
But I think that those articles put light to this deal that in a way that for many of us,
especially us men, who don't really understand what you must go through, but again,
there are such marvelous things that are happening now in science. Just think back a few
years ago there were some woman who could never ever have a hope of having a child
and now have one because of what they have been able to do. So I appreciate your
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concern and I give you that commitment that I will follow what the courts are doing and if
I sense your concern at all, I understand what you are talking about. Thank you Senator
Walker.
Thank you Mr. President. I want to compliment you for the amount of work that has gone
into this bill for many years. It is important legislation and something that we all need to
consider very seriously. I will be supporting the legislation, but I am still left with some
questions. I agree with the thoughts here that we certainly don't wont to allow woman
who are so busy doing other things that they do not want to go through pregnancy to be
able to enter into a contract for a surrogate mother. On the hand, I have had doctors call
me and ask how did they determine what is unreasonable to the physical or mental health
of the surrogate mom. That is a difficult thing to determine and there are some concerns
there. I also had a mother call and leave a voice mail for me that really tore at my heart.
She was not able to have a child because of problems with her uterus. So after saving
money and a consultation with medical experts she went in with her husband and donated
her eggs and his sperm and after quite a period of time, they were able to find a surrogate
who was able to deliver for them their first child. After that, after many years, her
husband passed away and they still have eggs and they still have sperm and that she
would like to use those to have another child so that her child would not be an only child
but under this bill, she is now a single mother, and she would not be given the protection
of Utah law, no she will not be criminally prosecuted, but she would not be able to get a
Utah birth certificate for this second child and I wonder if really want to exclude a
situation like that. I understand that there a lot of different examples that we could all
come up with and we certainly do not want to take things too far. But I think that we need
to look at this in the future, that maybe there some other concerns for protection.
Senator Peters: Thank you Mr. President. When you see a bill like this, I think that
everyone takes a pause because of the sensitive nature of these things. So I want you to
know that I am taking this bill very seriously. I believe that I have softened on most of
the issues that make me nervous. Just on one, on line 1432, as I read that it says that in a
nonbinding gestational agreement it goes from 1432 to 1435, if you are a surrogate
mother and you are not in a binding agreement with someone and you decide to keep the
child, it looks to me like this language makes you liable for some of these expenses of this
child. Am I reading that correctly?
That is right.
Could you just give me basis. Maybe I agree with you philosophically with you, but you
know we had a couple who was denied the ability to raise the child and I am just
wondering the logic behind it. Do you understand the question?
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I do, Senator Peters. I appreciate the question. Let me explain. The real emphasis of that
section is the intended parents who have this, go through this gestational agreement that is
non binding because of whatever reasons, it wasn't approved by court, they are taking
advantage of her, whatever the case might be, and then the baby is born. The question is if
she keeps the child I would assume that would be treated by DCFS, just as if a single
woman had gotten pregnant and now wanted to raise the baby. She cannot name the
father or the father was killed or the father has gone away. Then DCFS has a problem. I
think in this particular case I think that at that point in time, not only would she accept the
(in audible), she would accept the responsibility of the child and part of that would be is
that she would have to care for the child as her own. The other issue, she would have the
right to go back to court and say you know that I don't want this child, then will place this
child with DCFS for placing. DCFS, then with our state tax dollars, could go after the
intended parents and say, even though you didn't take the child, you didn't want the child
because the child was handicapped, we are going to deem you as the parents and you are
going to have to pay child support obligation to the cost of the tax payers of the state of
Utah. The concern that I have right now, is that if this bill doesn't pass, you have got the
wide open question that if the surrogate mother keeps the child, I think we treat it just like
a single mother having a child, assuming that she is single. Surrogate mothers can be
married. But on the other hand, you would have a chance that to go back to the intended
parents and say that started this ship down the river, which now has no pilot on the ship,
but you have got to pay for some of the fuel to get it down to the end.
In that case we get some difference of those natural parents to that placement of the child
once DCFS takes custody. Again I hope that question makes sense, but it seems like there
should be quite a bit of difference to the natural parents as to where the child should end
up. I think any lawyer can figure out a way to do that.
Do you just tell the intended parents to take the child as though the child were yours and
then place the child for adoption. I cannot solve the problem about the birth certificate
until we go one step further, but in that particular, if you had an unintended it is going to
show the birth mother as the biological birth mother and her name is going to be on the
birth certificate. I think that at that particular point, I think that if the birth mother doesn't
want the child, I suspect then the intended parents could take the child and through an
attorney do a private placement of that child in a way that the child can then be handled. I
do not know an agency that would not accept the child, even handicapped, even a mixed
racial, that would not take the child to place the child for adoption. I just think that it is
important, that if you are going to create a life, you are going to be instrumental in
creating a life, not only are there blessings but there are responsibilities. Now, I think that
is what this bill does. Thank you senator.
Lets see if anyone else wants to be recognized.
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It is really hard to summarize this bill. There is really one thing that I want to point out.
When I started this bill, a couple of years ago, I brought together what I thought to be
some of the best what I thought to be some of the best family practitioner lawyers in the
state. We worked through this bill, and that is why the emphasis on the social parent is
different. Harry (in audible), who chaired our committee, a very prominent family lawyer
in Houston Texas, has been following to say, he's given me his blessing that they deem
this to be the inner court law if we pass it as drafted now. So, I would certainly be glad to
answer further questions. In fact, DCFS, or excuse me Office of Recovery Services, has
prepared a summary for me of every section of this bill showing current Utah law as a
guess it summary because it is unsettled, and you just kind of have to guess which judge
will do, what they think the opinion is, what's statutory and what this changes, and I
would be glad to give that to anyone who wants this single section of our section and see
exactly the changes in Utah law and the clarifications made. With that I call for questions
on the bill.
When a question has been called should Senate Bill 14 be read for the third time
Senator Allen, Aaron, Bill, Randall, Christensen, Davis, Evans, (in audible), Hales,
Hatch, (in audible), Inkman, Billiard, Jenkins, Brandon, Kilpack, Knudson, Madsen,
Mansell, Maine, Peterson, Stevenson, Thomas, Blanik, Walker, Valentine.
I have two. Senate Bill 14 received 24 yes votes, 0 nay votes, with 5 being absent, will be
read for the third time.
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Tab 2

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - RULE 24

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.
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stayed together in an attempt to make their marriage
work. Father agreed to raise Z.P. as his own, and Mother
agreed to treat Father as Z.P.'s natural father. Z.P. was
bom in September 1999, and Father was named as Z.P.'s
father on his birth certificate. Father and Mother raised
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Third District, Salt Lake
Z.P. together until they separated in May 2000. After
Department, 004907881. The Honorable Tyrone Medley.
Pearson v. Third Dist. Court, 2003 UTApp 6, 2003 Utah separation and until the trial court's custody
determination, the Pearsons voluntarily shared physical
App. LEXIS 276 (2003)
custody of Z.P. on a fifty-fifty basis, nl
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Writ of certiorari granted
Pearson v. Pearson, 2006 Utah LEXIS 185 (Utah, July
21, 2006)

COUNSEL: Paige Bigelow, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant.
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JUDGES: William A. Thome Jr., Judge. WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Associate Presiding Judge,
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OPINION BY: William A. Thome Jr.

nl Thanos and Mother married in July 2002,
shortly after the trial court granted Mother's
request to bifurcate this case and entered a decree
of divorce between the Pearsons. Thanos and
Mother subsequently had another child, daughter
M.T., whose custody is not implicated in this
case. Also, despite the relationship between
Mother and Thanos prior to N.P.'s birth, there is
no suggestion that Thanos is N.P.'s biological
father.

OPINION: [**174] THORNE, Judge:
[*P1] Kelly F. Pearson (Father) appeals from the
trial court's supplemental decree of divorce awarding
joint legal custody of the minor child Z.P. to Kimberlee
Y. Pearson (Mother) and intervenor Peter D. Thanos. We
reverse.

BACKGROUND
[*P2] Father and Mother (collectively the Pearsons)
married in 1992. In July 1997, the couple had their first
child, N.P. In late 1998, Mother became pregnant again,
and a second son, Z.P., was bom in September 1999.
[*P3] Unbeknownst to Father, Mother had been
involved in a romantic relationship with Thanos
beginning sometime in 1996. Mother believed from early
on in her pregnancy with Z.P. that Thanos was Z.P.'s
biological father. She informed Father about her affair
[***2] with Thanos and her belief about Z.P.'s paternity
in March 1999. Despite Mother's infidelity, the Pearsons

[*P4] [***3] Mother informed Thanos in January 1999
that she believed him to be Z.P.'s biological father.
Thanos was unwilling to be known or recognized as the
child's father and did not provide any monetary support
toward Z.P.'s prenatal care or birth costs. Thanos
acquiesced in Father's role as Z.P.'s father. From birth
until about January 2001, the first sixteen months of
Z.P.'s life, Thanos did not provide any care or support for
Z.P. and only saw him about half a dozen times.
[*P5] In December 2000, Father initiated divorce
proceedings. Thanos moved to intervene in the
proceedings in January 2001, claiming that he was Z.P.'s
biological father. Concurrently, Mother denied Father's
paternity of Z.P. in her answer and asked the trial court to
declare that Father was not Z.P.'s biological father and
that he had no rights of custody or visitation with Z.P.
Father opposed both motions. The commissioner hearing
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parental presumption over Father had been rebutted,
the matter determined that Thanos lacked standing to
finding that for the first fifteen months of Z.P.'s life,
contest Z.P.'s paternity.
Thanos "did not have a strong mutual bond" with Z.P.,
[*P6]
Thanos and Mother objected to the
"did not demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice his own
commissioner's standing decision. The trial court
interests and welfare for [Z.P.], and generally lacked the
determined that the issue was governed by In re J.W.F.,
sympathy for and understanding of [Z.P.] that is
799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990), and that it [***4] needed
characteristic of parents generally." See Hutchison v.
additional information to adequately address the policy
Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982) (listing factors
considerations set forth in that case. The trial court
for rebuttal of parental presumption). Accordingly, the
appointed Dr. Jill Sanders to provide the court with an
trial court placed Father and Thanos on an equal footing
independent Schoolcraft analysis. n2 Sanders was to
and made its custody determination between them based
address the second prong of the Schoolcraft test-whether
solely on the best interests of Z.P. See id.
permitting Thanos to seek paternity of Z.P. [**175]
would be disruptive to Z.P.'s relationship with Father.
She concluded that Thanos's presence in Z.P.'s life would
n3 The parental presumption is "the
not be inherently harmful to Z.P. or to Z.P.'s relationship
presumption in favor of awarding custody to a
with Father.
natural parent over a nonparent." Davis v. Davis,
2001 UTApp 225,P1, 29 P.3d 676.
n2 The term "Schoolcraft analysis" refers to
the analysis set forth in In re J. W.F., 799 P. 2d
710 (Utah 1990), and is named for the petitioner
in that case. A Schoolcraft analysis determines a
person's standing to challenge the presumption of
legitimacy of a child born into a marriage, based
primarily on two policy considerations:
"preserving the stability of the marriage and
protecting children from disruptive and
unnecessary attacks upon their paternity." Id. at
713.
r***5i

[*P7] After considering Sanders's conclusions and
the Schoolcraft factors, the trial court granted Thanos's
motion to intervene in November 2002. Addressing the
first prong of the Schoolcraft analysis, the trial court
concluded that "the interest in preserving the stability of
the [Pearsons'] marriage is not a consideration, due to the
fact that there is no marriage to preserve. The stability
was shattered when the parties separated and [Z.P.] was
approximately nine months of age." As to the second
prong, the court relied on Sanders's report to conclude
that Thanos's challenge would not be "disruptive to Z.P.
or an unnecessary attack on his paternity," and was "in
the best interests of the child."
[*P8] Father and Thanos both filed motions for
summary judgment on the issue of Z.P.'s paternity. On
May 8, 2003, the trial court granted Thanos's motion and
denied Father's motion. The court's ruling determined
Thanos to be the natural, biological, and legal father of
Z.P.
[*P9] The trial court issued its custody decision on
May 11, 2004. Relying on its previous paternity
determination, the court applied the parental presumption
n3 in favor of Mother over Father [***6] as regards to
Z.P. The trial court next determined that Thanos's

[*P10] The trial court granted Mother and Thanos
joint legal custody and primary physical custody [***7]
of Z.P. Mother and Father were granted joint legal
custody of N.P., with primary physical custody in
Mother. Father was granted "joint physical custody time"
with N.P. and Z.P. The boys rotated between households
on a weekly basis, resulting in an approximately equal
amount of physical custody in each household.
[*P11] Father appeals from the trial court's order
allowing Thanos to intervene, its grant of summary
judgment to Thanos on the issue of Z.P.'s paternity, and
its custody determinations to the extent that they relied
on Thanos's paternity, and Father's non-paternity, of Z.P.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[*P12] Father raises multiple issues on appeal, but
our decision rests on the question of Thanos's standing to
challenge Z.P.'s paternity. Generally, a person's standing
to request particular relief presents a question of law. See
Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan,
2003 UT 58, P18, 82 P.3d 1125. To the extent that
factual findings inform the issue of standing, '"we review
such factual determinations made by a trial court with
deference.'" Id. (quoting Kearns-Tribune Corp. v.
Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373-74 (Utah 1997)). [***8]
'"Because of the important policy considerations
involved in granting or denying standing, we closely
review trial court determinations of whether a given set
of facts fits the legal requirements for standing, granting
minimal discretion to the trial court.'" Id. (quoting
Kearns-Tribune Corp., 946 P.2d at 374).
ANALYSIS
I. The Schoolcraft Test
[*P13] The trial court determined that, as of
November 2002, Thanos's challenge to Z.P.'s paternity
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would not affect the stability of the Pearsons' failed
"paramount considerations" that must guide standing
marriage and would not constitute a disruptive and
decisions in this context: "preserving the stability of the
unnecessary attack [**176] on Z.P.'s paternity. See In
marriage and protecting [***H]
children from
re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). Accordingly, the
disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon their paternity."
trial court found that Thanos had standing to challenge
Id. "Whether individuals can challenge the presumption
Z.P.'s paternity under the Schoolcraft test.
of legitimacy should depend not on their legal status
alone, but on a case-by-case determination of whether the
[*P14] While we do not necessarily disagree with
above-stated policies would be undermined by permitting
the trial court's factual findings regarding the evolution
the challenge." Id.
of the relationships between Z.P. and the various parties,
we determine that Thanos wholly lacked Schoolcraft
[*P18] In In re J.W.F., the parties' long separation
standing for a substantial period of time prior to his
prior to the birth of J.W.F. led the supreme court to
establishment of a relationship with Z.P. Even with the
conclude that "the stability of the marriage between
breakup of the Pearsons' marriage and the development
Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft was shaken long ago,
[***9] of a relationship between Z.P. and Thanos, we
and their marriage is one in name only." Id. The supreme
cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion that Thanos
court permitted a challenge to Winfield's paternity in
satisfied the Schoolcraft test by November 2002. See id.
these circumstances, deeming it "not inconsistent" with
at 713. Accordingly, we determine that the trial court
the stated policy of preserving the stability of the
erred in allowing Thanos to intervene in this action.
marriage. Id. Notably, each of the three cases cited in
Schoolcraft in support of this conclusion also involved
A. Preservation of the Stability of Marriage
situations where divorce or separation occurred prior to
or nearly concurrent with the birth of the child. See Teece
[*P15] The trial court found that "the first prong of
v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106, 106 (Utah 1986) ("In May of
the Schoolcraft analysis-relating to preserving the
1981, plaintiff gave birth to a child. Soon thereafter, she
stability of the marriage-was not a consideration in this
filed this action for divorce."); Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d
case, due to the fact that there was no marriage between
640, 641 (Utah 1982) [***12]
(addressing first
[Father] and [Mother] to be preserved." Although we
husband's attempt to deny paternity where child was
recognize that a divorce terminates any particular
conceived during his marriage but born into a subsequent
marriage and leaves nothing to preserve, we still disagree
marriage between mother and another man); Lopes v.
with the trial court's assumption that the first Schoolcraft
Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 518 P.2d 687, 688 (1974)
prong loses all relevance upon divorce. Rather, we
(addressing paternity question when child was yet "to be
review the totality of the circumstances to determine
[**177] born" at the time divorce pleadings were filed).
whether a particular paternity challenge conflicts with the
policy goal of preserving the stability of the marriage.
[*P19] By contrast, the Pearsons made substantial
efforts to maintain their marriage even though both
[*P16] The trial court apparently relied on In re
parties knew midway through Z.P.'s gestation that
J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990), to reach its finding
Thanos was the likely biological father. The Pearsons
that preservation of marriage becomes moot upon
disagree about their intent regarding Father's relationship
[***10] the divorce or separation of the parties. In that
to Z.P. Father contends that both he and Mother agreed
case, Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft were married in
that Father would raise Z.P. as his child in all respects,
1984 and lived together for approximately eight months
while Mother asserts only that she agreed to stay and try
before Linda left Winfield. See id. at 712. In November
to make the marriage work so long as Father would not
1985, some seven months to a year after the parties
punish her or Z.P. for her infidelity. The trial court made
separated, Linda gave birth to J.W.F. Linda abandoned
no findings on the issue, but did find that the Pearsons
J.W.F. shortly thereafter, and the State initiated
did not separate until Z.P. was approximately nine
abandonment proceedings in December 1985. Upon
months old.
learning of the child's birth and the abandonment
proceedings in August 1986, Winfield filed a petition for
[*P20] While not dispositive of Thanos's standing,
custody of J.W.F., arguing that he was married to Linda
we
determine
that the Pearsons' efforts to maintain their
and living with her at the time of conception. At this
marriage
after
Z.P.'s birth remain relevant to the
time, the parties had still not obtained a formal divorce.
Schoolcraft
[***13]
analysis, even post-divorce. The
See id.
question is not whether the Pearsons' marriage ultimately
failed, but rather whether the potential of a challenge to
[*P17] The standing issue in In re J.W.F. was
Z.P.'s paternity would have undermined the Pearsons'
whether a guardian ad litem could challenge Winfield's
marriage while it was still in existence. n4 Under Father's
custody petition and presumed paternity of J.W.F. The
version of events, the possibility of raising Z.P. as his
supreme court noted that "the class of persons permitted
own child without interference from Thanos was perhaps
to challenge the presumption of paternity should be
the central issue motivating him to make the marriage
limited." Id. at 713. The court then identified two
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work. While Mother's version is substantially different,
whatsoever, and his mother's husband, Winfield, never
even her recollection indicates the importance of the
had custody of J.W.F. or a relationship with him. See id.
issue to Father, and her own willingness to make the
at 712-13. J.W.F. was a little more than one year old at
the time of the initial standing dispute. Not surprisingly,
marriage work.
the supreme court had no trouble in determining that
allowing J.W.F.'s guardian ad litem standing to litigate
his paternity would not constitute an "unnecessary and
n4 We note that Thanos's paternity challenge
disruptive attack[]" on J.W.F.'s paternity. Id. at 713. The
arose entirely within the duration of the Pearsons'
court stated that "J.W.F.'s expectations as to who his
marriage, and that Thanos filed his motion to
[***16] father is cannot be shaken by permitting a
intervene concurrently with Mother's responsive
challenge to the presumption of legitimacy. The child has
pleading in the Pearsons' divorce case, prior to
never had a relationship with [Winfield] Schoolcraft, [or
the actual decree of divorce.
his biological father], [**178] or even his mother, so he
has no expectations as to who his father is." Id.
[*P21] In any event, the Pearsons stayed together
[*P24] Clearly, the present case does not involve a
in marriage for over a year after Father first became
lack of paternal relationships. Rather, the trial court was
aware of Thanos's paternity of Z.P. [***14] The trial
presented with an undisputed and ongoing paternal
court erred in failing to recognize that the Pearsons'
relationship between Father and Z.P., as well as Thanos's
shared parentage of Z.P. represented a stabilizing force in
evolving relationship with Z.P. as a stepfather, and as the
their then-existing marriage, and that the potential of a
father of one of Z.P.'s siblings. In its November 2002
paternity challenge would diminish that stabilizing effect.
order granting Thanos's motion to intervene, the trial
Thus, even after the Pearsons filed for divorce, Thanos's
court explained its ultimate rationale on the unnecessary
challenge to Z.P.'s paternity can be said to have had some
and disruptive prong:
undermining effect on the stability of the Pearsons'
marriage within the meaning of Schoolcraft's public
The court cannot find that granting
policy analysis. n5 While the reality of the Pearsons'
Mr. Thanos the standing to intervene
ultimate divorce may minimize the importance of the
would be disruptive to [Z.P.] or an
first Schoolcraft prong, we cannot say on the facts of this
unnecessary
attack on his paternity. In this
case that it obviates that prong altogether.
case, as indicated by Dr. Sanders in her
report, Mr. Thanos has an established
relationship with the child and there is
N5 We note that the public policy in favor of
nothing in the reports of Dr. Sanders that
preserving the stability of marriage, always strong
would suggest allowing Mr. Thanos to
in Utah, may be even stronger in light of Utah's
intervene would be adverse to the best
enshrinement of so-called traditional marriage
interests of the child. The report of Dr.
into its constitution in 2004. See Utah Const, art.
Sanders, to the [***n]
contrary,
I, § 29 (Supp. 2005); but see Citizens for Equal
indicates that it is in the best interests of
Prot v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb.
the child to allow Mr. Thanos to
2005) (declaring a similar state constitutional
intervene. n6
amendment invalid on various grounds including
free association and equal protection).
r***j^i

The November order also recognized that Father had
"functioned as Z.P.'s father since his birth."

B. Protection of Children from Attacks on Paternity
[*P22] The second, and in this case more
problematic, policy consideration under the Schoolcraft
test is "protecting children from disruptive and
unnecessary attacks upon their paternity." In re J.W.F.,
799 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1990). There are crucial
distinctions between the Pearsons' case and In re J. W.F.
that lead us to conclude that Thanos's challenge to Z.P.'s
paternity is both disruptive and unnecessary.
[*P23] In In re J.W.F., J.W.F. was promptly
abandoned by his mother at birth, his natural father
apparently never sought or enjoyed any parental role

n6 Dr. Sanders's May 13, 2002 report
concluded that "from a developmental and
psychological perspective, [Z.P.]'s functioning is
not inherently disrupted by [Thanos's]
involvement and [Thanos's] relationship with
[Z.P.] is necessary to [Z.P.]'s normal and positive
development." Dr. Sanders's supplemental report
of August 26, 2002, further concluded that "there
is no reason to believe that further disruption to
the relationship between [Z.P.] and [Father] is
intrinsically linked to Mr. Thanos'[s] presence in
[Z.P.]'s life."
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supplemental report [**179] of August 26, 2002
Mere involvement or presence in a child's
confirmed that Z.P. and Father shared a "strong and
life is a very different thing than a legal challenge
positive parent-child attachment." Despite Dr. Sanders's
to the child's paternity. Thus, we do not see Dr.
other conclusions regarding Z.P.'s best interests, n7 her
Sanders's reports as being responsive to the
findings of a continuing paternal relationship between
Schoolcraft goal of "protecting [Z.P.] from
Z.P. and Father should have been the central focus of the
disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon [his]
trial court's Schoolcraft analysis.
paternity." In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d at 713
(emphasis added).
[***18]
[*P25] We have no reason to question the trial
court's findings as they relate to the contents of Dr.
Sanders's report or the existence of some relationship
between Thanos and Z.P. in November 2002. However,
despite the paternal role that Thanos may eventually have
attempted to take, the undisputed facts of the case are
that Thanos had little interest or involvement in Z.P.'s life
until he was approximately sixteen months of age. The
trial court recognized as much in its October 2001 order
initially denying Thanos's motion to intervene: "Mr.
Thanos was completely absent from [Z.P.'s] first year of
life, was absent for the first half of his second year of
life, and has had incidental contact during the second half
of the second year of [Z.P.'s] life." As a result of this
intentional absence, Z.P. developed a paternal
relationship exclusively with Father over the first two
years of his life, a relationship that both Father and Z.P.
apparently continue to foster to the present.
[*P26] The Schoolcraft analysis is not intended to
protect children from all attacks on their paternity, but
only those that are disruptive and unnecessary. See id. In
evaluating the disruptiveness [***19] of a paternity
challenge, the supreme court focused on the child's
relationship with the existing father figure and the child's
"expectations as to who his father is." Id. Here, the trial
court found in its October 2001 order that Father was the
"psychological father of [Z.P.]," that Z.P. had "become
closely bonded with [Father]," and that those bonds were
"critical." The trial court further found as a factual matter
that to permit Thanos "to establish his paternity of [Z.P.]
and to be introduced at this point as a father figure in
[Z.P.'s] life would be immediately disruptive to the
child's stability." These facts leave little doubt that, at
least as of October 2001, Thanos's paternity challenge
would have been disruptive to Z.P.'s existing paternal
relationship with Father and Z.P.'s expectations as to who
his father was.
[*P27] We see nothing in the record to indicate that
the mere passage of time, or the integration of Thanos
into Z.P.'s life as Mother's husband, destroyed or even
diminished Z.P.'s paternal relationship with Father or his
expectations as to who his father was. To the contrary,
Dr. Sanders's May 13, 2002 report found that "[Z.P.]
identifies [Father] [***20] as his father and their
attachment is secure, strong and healthy." Her

n7 We are aware that disregarding Dr.
Sanders's conclusions regarding Z.P.'s best
interests seems counterintuitive given the central
role that the best interests standard plays in every
case involving juveniles. Nevertheless, in the
context of determining standing to contest
paternity, the Schoolcraft test is the standard set
by the supreme court to measure the child's best
interests as those interests balance against the
rights of others.
[*P28] In light of those findings, we cannot say that
Thanos's attack on Z.P.'s paternity would not have been
disruptive to Z.P.'s paternal [***21] relationship with
Father and his expectations about whom his father was.
The entire motivation for Thanos's attempt to intervene
was to establish that he, rather than Father, was to fulfill
the paternal role in Z.P.'s life. Whatever other effects
Thanos's challenge might ultimately have on Z.P., his
direct attack on Father's paternity of Z.P. certainly fails
the Schoolcraft directive of avoiding disruption of
existing paternal relationships.
[*P29] We must also examine whether Thanos's
paternity challenge can be deemed "necessary." Id. In re
J.W.F. did not provide guidance on distinguishing
between necessary and unnecessary paternity challenges,
and the trial court did not expressly address the issue. We
presume that, like the disruption element, the necessity
element must be analyzed primarily from the child's
perspective rather than from Father's or Thanos's. See id.
(emphasizing a policy of "protecting children" and
analyzing disruption from the child's perspective). We
also assume, without deciding, that Schoolcraft standing
always exists at birth and can be lost only thereafter. Cf.
Utah Code Ann. § 78- 30-4.14(2) (2002) (establishing
standards by [***22] which unmarried biological father
can establish paternity so as to defeat adoption of his
child by another at birth).
[*P30] Proceeding under these assumptions, we
cannot see how Thanos's ability to challenge Z.P.'s
paternity remained necessary after he voluntarily
absented himself from Z.P.'s life. From Z.P.'s
perspective, he had a father in Father from his earliest
ability to form paternal bonds. Had the Pearson marriage
succeeded, Father would likely have remained Z.P.'s
father in all regards throughout the foreseeable future.
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Dr. Sanders found that, even when the Pearsons'
an unmarried biological father n9 must comply with in
marriage failed, Z.P. continued to identify Father as his
order to establish his paternity. See id. When the
father and enjoy a strong paternal relationship with him.
adoption involves a child under six months of age,
Thus, at the time of the trial court's intervention order,
section 78-30- 4.14(2) establishes specific acts, including
Z.P. had a father and was not in need of a different one.
initiating a paternity action, [***25] that the father must
take prior to the mother executing her consent to the
[*P31] We need not determine the exact point at
adoption. See id. § 78-30- 4.14(2)(b). The mother's
which Thanos's paternity challenge became unnecessary
consent to adoption can be executed as little as twentyfor Schoolcraft purposes. It is sufficient in this case to
four hours after the child's birth. See id. § 78-30-4.19
determine that there existed a period of many months
(2002). A father who fails to comply with the
during which Z.P. developed a strong paternal
requirements of section 78-30-4.14(2) has no standing to
relationship with a loving and willing presumed father.
object to the adoption and permanently loses his parental
So long as that relationship continues, it cannot be
rights to the child. See id. § 78-30-4.14(5); In re
[***23] said for Schoolcraft purposes that Z.P. has any
adoption ofB.B.D., 1999 UT 70, PP10-12, 984 P.2d 967
particular need for his paternity to be established in
("Under Utah law, 'an unmarried biological father has an
another man. n8
inchoate interest that acquires constitutional protection
only when he demonstrates a timely and full commitment
to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during
n8 This is not inconsistent with Dr. Sanders's
pregnancy and upon the child's birth.'" (quoting Utah
assessment that Thanos has a potentially valuable
Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(e) (1996)).
role to play in Z.P.'s life. That role, however,
need not be as the primary father figure.
[*P32] Looking at the circumstances of this case as
a whole, we conclude that the trial court should have
deemed Thanos's attack on Z.P.'s paternity both
disruptive and unnecessary. Thanos's challenge to Z.P.'s
presumed paternity became disruptive and unnecessary
when he allowed Z.P. to form paternal bonds with
Father, and will likely remain so, for Schoolcraft
purposes, as long as those bonds continue.
C. The Trial Court Erred in Allowing Thanos to
Intervene
[*P33] In light of our conclusions regarding the
application of the Schoolcraft factors to this case, we
determine that Thanos lacks standing to challenge Z.P.'s
paternity and that the trial court erred by allowing him to
intervene [***24] in the Pearsons' divorce action.
[**180] While the Pearsons' marriage may be long
dissolved, we must give some weight to the fact that the
Pearsons attempted to save their marriage, and that
Father's intent and ability to raise Z.P. as his own were
significant factors in that decision. Most significantly,
however, an attack on Z.P.'s paternity at this point would
be disruptive of Z.P.'s strong paternal relationship with
Father, a relationship that renders Thanos's challenge
unnecessary from Z.P.'s perspective. Under these
circumstances, Thanos does not have Schoolcraft
standing, and the trial court erred in allowing him to
intervene.
[*P34] We analogize Thanos's status to that of an
unmarried father seeking to establish parental rights to
his child in the face of the mother's intent to have the
child adopted. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2).
Section 78-30-4.14(2) sets out various requirements that

n9 "Unmarried biological father" for
purposes of Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(2)
means a man not married to the child's mother,
without regard to whether the man is married to
another. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.11
(2002) (repealed 2005) (defining "unmarried
biological father"); id. § 78-30-1.1(5) (Supp.
2005) (same).
[***26]
[*P35] By holding Thanos to a similar, if
somewhat more generous, standard, we recognize that a
husband is presumed to be the legal father of a child born
into his marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2(2)
(Supp. 2005). In the vast majority of marital births, the
husband is also the natural, biological father of the child.
However, in the hopefully rare instance where a child
born into a marriage is fathered by another man, the
husband is nevertheless deemed the father of the child,
with all concomitant rights and responsibilities, unless
and until his paternity is successfully challenged under
the Utah Uniform Parentage Act. See id. § § 78-45g-101
to -902 (Supp. 2005); id. §
30-1-17.2(4) ("A
presumption of paternity established under this section
may only be rebutted in accordance with Section 78-45g607.n). Essentially, an illegitimate child born into a
marriage is immediately subject to a de facto adoption by
the mother's husband. We see no reason why a man who
chooses to procreate with the wife of another should be
granted significant latitude to challenge the husband's de
facto adoption, while one who fails to timely establish
his [***27] paternity of a child born to an unmarried
woman is permanently barred from doing so upon the
mother's mere consent to the child's adoption.
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[*P36] Like any other unmarried father who fails to
perfect his inchoate parental rights, Thanos lost his
standing to contest Z.P.'s paternity sometime during the
early months of Z.P.'s life. Despite the evolving
circumstances of this case, we conclude that since that
time Thanos has not met, and to our knowledge still does
not meet, the Schoolcraft factors. nlO Accordingly, the
trial court erred in granting Thanos's January 2001
motion to intervene and his subsequent motion for
summary judgment establishing his paternity of Z.P.

nlO We express no opinion on the separate
question of whether Schoolcraft standing, once
lost, can ever be regained due to changed
circumstances.
II. Z.P.'s Paternity and Custody
[*P37] Our determination that it was error to allow
Thanos to intervene in the Pearsons' [**I81] divorce
action has inescapable consequences for the trial court's
[***28] paternity and custody orders. With Thanos
improperly joined in this litigation, the trial court's
consideration of Thanos's motion for summary judgment
to establish paternity, and the genetic evidence in support
thereof, was error. And, of course, the court's May 2003
order granting Thanos's summary judgment on the issue
of his fatherhood of Z.P. was also erroneous and is
reversed.
[*P38] With Thanos and all of his various
pleadings and evidence out of the litigation, Father
remains the presumed and legal father of Z.P. See Utah
Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2(2). Accordingly, the trial court
erred in applying the parental presumption in favor of
Mother nil and against Father in making its ultimate
custody decision regarding Z.P. Other aspects of the trial
court's supplemental decree of divorce also rely,
explicitly or implicitly, on Thanos's paternity of Z.P., and
these aspects of the final order are also erroneous and
must be revisited as appropriate.

nil We recognize that Mother asserted
Father's non-paternity of Z.P. in her answer and
in a simultaneous motion to show cause, and that
she could have litigated Z.P.'s paternity on
identical evidence in Thanos's absence.
Regardless of this possibility, Z.P.'s paternity was
actually litigated almost exclusively between
Father and Thanos, an improper party. We rule
today solely on the issues before us, and neither
Mother nor Thanos argue on appeal that Mother's
pleadings provide an independent ground to
affirm the trial court's paternity finding.

More importantly, for all of the reasons set
forth in this opinion, Mother would also appear to
be barred from challenging Z.P.'s paternity on the
facts and posture of this case. She too would lack
Schoolcraft standing, see In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d
710, 713 (Utah 1990), and her actions prior to the
initiation of divorce proceedings might support a
determination that her challenge was barred by
equitable estoppel. See Dahl Inv. Co. v. Hughes,
2004 UT App 391.P14, 101 R3d 830 (listing
elements of equitable estoppel); see also Kristen
D. v. Stephen D., 280 A.D.2d 717, 719 N.Y.SJd
771, 772-73 (App. Div. 2001) ("Courts have long
recognized the availability of the doctrine of
equitable estoppel as a defense in a paternity
proceeding." (citations omitted)); Richard W. v.
Roberta Y., 240 A.D.2d 812, 658 N.Y.SJd 506
(App. Div. 1997) (applying equitable estoppel
principles to bar a paternity challenge). For the
same reasons, Father would also appear to be
barred from seeking to disestablish paternity of
Z.P. should he ever choose to do so.
We express no opinion on whether Z.P.
himself, the state of Utah, or any other person or
entity could ever challenge Father's paternity, or
the circumstances that might permit such a
challenge.
[***29]
[*P39] We reverse the trial court's orders below to
the extent that they rely on Thanos's paternity of Z.P.,
and remand this matter to the trial court for the issuance
of a new custody order, taking into account Father's legal
paternity of Z.P.
CONCLUSION
[*P40] Thanos should not have been allowed to
intervene in this matter due to a lack of Schoolcraft
standing. Accordingly, the presumption of Father's
legitimate parentage of Z.P. remains unrebutted, and
Father remains the legal parent of Z.P. The trial court's
supplemental decree of divorce, as well as any other
order entered below, is reversed to the extent that it
conflicts with Father's legal status as Z.P.'s parent or was
premised on Thanos's paternity. This matter is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
[*P41] WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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